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ABSTRACT
We model the regional highway system of Central California and consider the challenge of evac-
uating a highly populated region from the threat of catastrophic flood. Specifically, we build a
minimum cost network flow problem to represent the movement of more than one million peo-
ple within Yolo, Sacramento, San Joaquin, and Stanislaus Counties. Our model solves for “best
case” evacuation routes and clearing times assuming perfect knowledge of flood inundation and
road conditions. Our model is large but efficient, solving 35 separate scenarios in less than 45
minutes. We develop two basic evacuation scenarios, each having many variations, resulting in
490 total scenarios. For these, we analyze model assumptions and the effect of interruptions to
evacuation behavior for a range of “what-if” situations.
v
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We model the evacuation of inhabitants of Yolo, Sacramento, San Joaquin and Stanislaus Coun-
ties of Central California using a minimum cost network flow model of the regional highway
system. Our model MINATRISK solves for “best case” evacuation routes and clearing times
assuming perfect knowledge by all travelers of road conditions. Our model is large, but effi-
cient, solving 35 separate scenarios in less than 45 minutes. By solving separate scenarios, we
analyze model assumptions and the effect of interruptions to evacuation behavior for a range of
“what-if” situations.
We develop two models to identify optimal evacuation routes as well as quantify highway de-
mands during an evacuation in Yolo, Sacramento, San Joaquin and Stanislaus counties. MINA-
TRISK is a single commodity minimum cost network flow model, and MINDIST is a shortest
path optimization model which identifies the shortest path from every node in the network to
every one of the possible evacuation points. We represent the system of highways in Region IV
as a network, with ZIP codes representing sources of evacuees, transshipment nodes as highway
junctions, and arcs as highway segments.
We establish a base case evolved from California Highway Patrol’s Standard Operating Proce-
dure which does not currently plan for contraflow, and apply this case to two baseline scenarios
one in which Sacramento County is evacuated, and one in which ZIP codes which lie adjacent
to the rivers of the region are evacuated. These scenarios differ only in the subset of ZIP codes
which are directed to evacuate in the first epoch. Our model indicates that it is possible to evac-
uate approximately 1.2 million people from Sacramento County and River-Side evacuations in
24-hours and 15-hours respectively. We find that the shortest route for most evacuees is to travel
to evacuation locations to the East and in the Bay Area. We find that loss of access to the evac-
uation points east of the valley increases evacuation clearing times by 25% in the Sacramento
County scenario and 40% in the River-Side scenario.
We adjust parameters in the model to cause highway inundations and allow for the use of con-
traflow. Inundating highways did not substantially change evacuation results however, the in-
undation of I-5 combined with the loss of evacuation point “PointsE” did cause more people
to travel to evacuation point “PointsS” in the River-Side evacuation than in any other scenario.
Furthermore, because we assume two passengers per vehicle, we find people evacuate six hours
faster with the use of contraflow. However, because the evacuation of Sacramento County in
xvii
its entirety is unlikely, and the River-Side evacuation more plausible, we find that our model
and the analysis of its results does not support the establishment of contraflow if the evacuating
population is not concentrated as in the Sacramento County case.
Our model results show, for each scenario, the number of frustrated travelers in every time pe-
riod over the planning horizon, and therefore paints a clear picture of the progress of the evac-
uation in each scenario. An important first step in understanding evacuations, the results of our
model can provide insights to emergency planners for the positioning of supplies, determining




Water, an undeniable necessity of life and a highly prized resource, at times is also a catalyst for
vast destruction and death. The Sacramento-San Joaquin river delta, located in the northwest
portion of California’s Central Valley, drains more than 700,000 acres into the San Francisco
Bay via 700 miles of waterways and approximately 1,100 miles of levees CALFED Bay-Delta
Program (CALFED) (2000). Three major rivers, fed by an enormous watershed (see Figure 1.1),
converge and drain through the delta: The American and Sacramento rivers (with the added flow
of the Feather River and the Yuba River) drain from north to south, while the San Joaquin River
and its tributaries drain from south to north. Normal flows combined with “intense rainfall,
Figure 1.1: The watershed which feeds the delta drains the majority of California’s rainfall and snow melt (Bass,
2011)
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rapid snowmelt, or a combination of these weather-related events are the common causes of
Central Valley floods” (Fridirici & Shelton, 2000). As a result of this threat, it is not uncommon
to see homes in the region built on stilts to raise their elevations above sea level as an added
protection against levee failure. Figure 1.2 shows the historic impact of flooding on the delta.
Consequently, for many residents who reside within the delta the risk of flood is a part of
everyday life.
Figure 1.2: Historic flood patterns over the delta region. (Gaddie et al., 2007)
1.1 History
Within 11 years of its founding, the city of Sacramento faced its first two floods, followed 11
years later by the great 1861–1862 flood. With water flowing over the top of levees built in
the preceding decade, parts of Sacramento sat 20 feet below water, resulting in Governor-elect
Leland Stanford being transported to his inauguration in a row boat (Center For Sacramento
History, 2004). Over the next 90 years, the region experienced only mild flooding until new
records were set in 1951. Between 1951 and 1997, the region experienced five record-setting
floods, culminating in the major 1997 flood, which killed eight people and caused approximately
$1.95 billion in damage (Fridirici & Shelton, 2000).
Major floods in this region are typically generated by two different types of storms that occur
during an El Nin˜o season. One of the two types is caused by the cold arctic fronts that primarily
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deliver snow to mid and high elevations across the state. In a normal season, this snow melts
during late spring and into the summer months gradually feeding runoff into the river system.
The second type, known as a “Pineapple Express” storm, is much warmer and originates in the
Pacific, delivering snow only to the highest elevations and extreme rain to all other elevations.
These warm storms not only cause small stream floods just from rainfall but can increase snow
melt at elevations which are not cold enough to form this precipitation into snow.
This was the scenario in the winter of 1996–1997, when cold front-driven storms moved into
California delivering the “second wettest December since 1922, when records began for the
Northern Sierra” (Fridirici & Shelton, 2000). This storm not only delivered inches of rainfall
to lower elevations but also packed the Sierra-Nevada Mountain range with deep snow. On 26
December 1996, a Pineapple Express storm hit California and lingered until 2 January 1997,
its seven-day downpour, combined with the five days of rain preceding the Pineapple Express,
delivered 47.6 inches of rain, 40% of a normal rain year, and melted previously deposited snow
at lower elevations (Fridirici & Shelton, 2000). The moisture from this series of storms pro-
duced the wettest two consecutive months in California’s history. Within days, reservoirs that
were expected to take weeks to fill were forced to release as much water as possible within their
design specifications. For some dams, it was still not enough.
On 2 January 1997, Don Pedro Dam on the San Joaquin River reached its maximum capacity
“and water spilled over the emergency spillway. Releases from the dam measured 59,000 cfs
[cubic feet per second]” (Fridirici & Shelton, 2000). Downstream in Modesto, at the Ninth
Street Bridge, the in-stream flow was six times normal capacity. Don Pedro was only one
example of dams exceeding capacity and releases exceeding design specifications. This regional
problem resulted in downstream flows greater than the levees were designed to hold. With
increased flows, the flood levels set seven high-water records (see Table 1.1). As a result, 36
Federal Project levees failed on the San Joaquin River and 12 failed on the Sacramento River.
These failures flooded vast tracts of land which eased flows further downstream where the flows
fell within designed levee capacities but at the cost of over $1billion in damage.
By 9 January 1997, the worst of the damage was done, and most of the flood waters started to
recede. The tally of damaged and destroyed property: 12,792 residences, and 1,752 businesses.
Over the course of the 12-day storm, more than 120,000 people were evacuated (Mullins et al.,
1997), with most of the evacuees originating from San Joaquin and Stanislaus counties.
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Table 1.1: Fridirici & Shelton Table 1.
Selected Flood Peaks for 1998, 1997, & 1986 (feet)
River Station Feb. 1998 Jan. 1997 Feb. 1986 Previous Record
Above Bend Bridge 27.9 30.6 32.8 36.6 Jan. 1970
Ord Ferry 118.2 118.7 118.3 119.8 Jan. 1970
Colusa 68.3 68.6* 68 68.5 Mar. 1983
Fremont 38.5 42.5* 41.7 41.7 Feb. 1986
Sacramento
Sacramento, I St. 25.2 30.4 30.7* 30.7 Feb. 1986
Yuba City 54.9 78.2* 76.3 76.3 Feb. 1986Feather
Nicolaus n/a 50.4* 49.1 49.1 Feb. 1986
American H Street 33.4 42.7 43.4* 43.4 Feb. 1986
Cosumnes Michigan Bar 13.2 18.3* 14.8 14.8 Feb. 1986
Tuolumne Modesto 56.6 70.9* 55.2 69.2 Dec. 1950
San Joaquin Newman 64.6 66.1* 64.7 65.9 Feb. 1969
* New Record
1.2 Mitigation Efforts
History shows that flooding in this region can potentially affect hundreds of thousands of people
within a short period of time. After the 1862 flood, Sacramento residents began an aggressive
campaign to build levees, redirect rivers, and create weirs and bypass channels in an attempt
to prevent future major floods (Sacramento Area Flood Control Agency (SAFCA), 2008). The
cycle of flood and restoration, followed by the building of preventive infrastructure, defines the
region, but despite ongoing efforts, floods continue to ravage the area.
Since the 1997 flood devastated this region, organizers from neighboring counties recognized
the need for regional support. A flood event that required relatively few evacuations could be
handled by the local jurisdictions; however, no structure existed to support neighboring counties
in the event of a need to evacuate a substantial portion of a regional population. Starting in
2000, the directors of the California Office of Emergency Services for the counties affected by
the 1997 flood held a series of meetings to address this problem (Baldwin, 2010). After three
years of meetings, officials developed the “Inland Region Mass Evacuation System Operations
Manual” (Baldwin, 2006a) and its counterpart for local jurisdictions, “Local Government Guide
to Inland Region Mass Evacuation System” (Baldwin, 2006b). These documents called for a
regional coordinating agency with authority to direct county resources during a regional mass
evacuation scenario.
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Established in 2009, almost seven years after completion of the documents which called for its
creation, the California Emergency Management Agency (CAL EMA) stood up.
CAL EMA is responsible for the coordination of overall state agency response to
major disasters in support of local government. The Agency is responsible for as-
suring the state’s readiness to respond to and recover from all hazards — natural,
manmade, war-caused emergencies and disasters — and for assisting local govern-
ments in their emergency preparedness, response, recovery, and hazard mitigation
efforts. (California Office of Emergency Services (OES), 2011a)
CAL EMA divides responsibilities for supporting local counties across several administrative
regions. To be better prepared for this and other threats, the state of California divided itself
into several Emergency Management Mutual Aid Regions (see Figure 1.3 at left). Region IV,
the focus of our analysis, is comprised of 11 counties (see Figure 1.3 at right), and home to
3.5 million people. Four counties in Region IV, Yolo, Sacramento, San Joaquin, and Stanislaus
counties experienced the wrath of the 1997 flood. Together they house 78% of the population
or 2.8 million people (U.S. Census Bureau, 2000). Region IV administrators are responsible for
Figure 1.3: California Emergency Management Agency Region IV.
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coordinating and assisting with emergency situations which impact multiple counties. As such it
enhanced the recommendations of the “Local Government Guide to Inland Region Mass Evac-
uation System Operations Manual” (Baldwin, 2006a) and implemented the plan for a regional
evacuation system. The result is a streamlined foundation for multi county, inter-jurisdictional
operations with the intent of “coordinating traffic control, evacuee roadside assistance on major
evacuation corridors, [and] coordinated shelter information for evacuees” (California Office of
Emergency Services (OES), 2010).
1.3 The Challenge
Towns and highways have a co-evolving, dependent relationship. Towns grow along highway
routes, and in turn regional planners expand highway capacity in response to increased demand
for travel by the local population. Modern highways are designed to handle the anticipated
needs of travelers during normal traffic patterns (e.g., daily commuting). These patterns typi-
cally involve a diversity of destinations, resulting in traffic moving several directions at once.
However, in a mass evacuation scenario, the population has, generally speaking, the same evac-
uation destination(s), resulting in a concentration of traffic along the same routes. If a large
number of people are forced to evacuate an area, highways quickly exceed their designed ca-
pacities, and the rate of vehicles slows because of congestion. The inability to move people
along a given route has a significant impact on the amount of time to evacuate a population,
known as the clearing time.
Even in a moderate flood, the highways that run north and south through California’s Central
Valley are likely to become inundated by rising water levels at some point. For example, Inter-
state Highway 5 (I-5) and California Highway 99 (CA-99) were closed in sections or reduced
to one lane as a result of flooding in 1997. This scenario leaves the east-west highways as the
possible evacuation routes for the people who live in Yolo, Sacramento, Stanislaus, and San
Joaquin counties. The risk of catastrophic flood to the region and its impact is widely recog-
nized by State and Federal government officials, who selected this flooding scenario as the focus
of the 2011 Golden Guardian statewide emergency planning and response exercise (California
Office of Emergency Services (OES), 2011b).
1.4 Purpose
The purpose of any evacuation model is to assess the ability to evacuate a target population from
a given area in an adequate amount of time. In essence, one needs to compute the total time
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to evacuate the last person from the at-risk area. However, viewing this region and the result-
ing evacuation from the perspective of a network flow problem enables a much more in-depth
analysis of the evacuation and the impacts it will likely have on the entire region. We consider
several factors: potential evacuation routes for an at-risk population, the capacity constraints
affecting evacuation times, and whether evacuation route planning can relieve evacuation times.
Also, we calculate the average distance evacuees travel as well as identify possible bottlenecks
in the network. Finally, we track the flow of vehicles into and out of each county over the var-
ious routes to provide emergency planners an estimate of the number of evacuees expected to
travel through their county. Although Region IV is staffed with emergency planners possessing
decades of experience, an essential requirement for successful planning, the analysis generated
by this thesis is intended to provide planners key insights into how evacuation plans may be
further refined.
In the next Chapter, we review recent and current research on evacuations and describe the
methods used to develop evacuation plans. We then present our models in Chapter 3 followed
by our analysis in Chapter 4. Finally, we give our recommendations and opportunities for future
work based on our analysis in the final Chapter.
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A large body of academic literature exists on the study of evacuations. Yusoff, Ariffin, &
Mohamed (2008) illustrate the diversity of this field in their broad survey of evacuation models.
This chapter provides a partial review of relevant work in order to place our contribution in
broader context, as well as describe how others in the field conduct similar efforts. For our
purposes, several factors affect the behavior of an evacuation. For each, we summarize key
features and describe how we address them in our analysis.
2.1 When Do People Leave?
Time is of the essence in an evacuation. To obtain a sufficient measure of how long an evacu-
ation takes, we must understand how an at-risk population responds when notified to evacuate.
Sorensen (1991, p. 154) argues that people react to an evacuation warning in accordance with
a logistic distribution. Garcia, Llinares, Marrero, Ortiz, & Rodriquez-Losada (2010) also use
a statistical distribution to describe the “panic-factor” that some people experience when faced
with an emergency. Santos & Aguirre (2005, p. 43) argue that “people [do] not panic” but rather
act with clarity and decisiveness when faced with an evacuation. This argument coincides with
Sorensen (1991, p. 162) who concedes that despite dozens of studies over 25 years, “analysis
provides only a sketchy answer” with regard to how people react when notified to evacuate.
We do not account for any panic factors in our modeling. Sorensen (1991) makes clear that
despite any initial delay, panic appears to be event-specific, but is measured in minutes. We
make the simple assumption that if our population is able to leave their starting location, they
do so by the end of the first time epoch (a matter of hours or days) in which they have been
ordered to evacuate. An epoch is a flexible duration of time at the end of which, our model
reviews the state of the evacuation.
2.2 Where Do Evacuating Populations Go?
Understanding where people go when they leave can be just as important as recognizing the
need to evacuate. Two possibilities are that the population travels to the closest evacuation
point (to minimize clearing time) or that they head toward a specific evacuation destination
(e.g., because they have friends and/or family there). The routes they take will affect how long
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it takes them to get to the evacuation destination. In some cases, individuals decide their own
routes based on availability, while in other cases, local officials pre-plan emergency routes.
Ardekani, Assavapokee, & Lahmar (2006) present a four-tiered evacuation model to assess
evacuations in the hurricane prone region of the southeastern United States. Their first-stage
evacuation model assesses the over-all feasibility of the evacuation in terms of time. This model,
known as the “Rough-Cut Capacity Plan” (RCCP), measures the amount of time it takes to
evacuate an at-risk population in a manner that minimizes the overall evacuation time. Second,
they develop a model based on the population being able to evacuate within a specific time
window. The “Detailed Capacity Plan” (DCP) evaluates the evacuation given preferred safe
destinations for evacuees. Third, they create the “Restricted Evacuation Plan” (REP) model
used to explore back-up evacuation plans if the RCCP is not feasible. Finally, in the event that
the DCP is not feasible, they use the “Enforced Evacuation Plan” (EEP) to “evaluate alternative
strategies that enforce specific safety destinations” (Ardekani et al., 2006, p. 616).
We model evacuation behavior where evacuees evacuate to any safe destination in a manner
which minimizes distance traveled. We do not constrain the routes available to the evacuees;
however, we do conduct “what-if analysis” surrounding the loss of specific highway routes.
2.3 By What Means Do Evacuees Travel?
Renne, Sanchez, & Litman (2008) present an overview of the issues associated with multi-
modal (e.g., carless) evacuation by populations with special needs. Chapter 2 of that report
provides a review and taxonomy for different disaster types. In this thesis, we ignore the need
to evacuate populations by means other than personally owned vehicles; that is, we assume that
everyone has the ability to drive in either their own vehicles or in a vehicle of someone they
know.
2.4 How Does Capacity Influence Evacuations?
Highway capacity is a major limiting factor in the amount of time it takes to evacuate a pop-
ulation, particularly because demand along individual highway segments during an evacuation
can greatly exceed normal travel conditions. In some cases, Emergency Services can augment
highway capacity by opening both sides of a highway, which travel in opposing directions un-
der normal circumstances, to traffic traveling in one direction. This technique is known as
contraflow. As noted by Xie, Waller, & Kockelman (2011), “in evacuation cases, the traffic
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direction of inbound lanes along some designated roadways may be reversed to better accom-
modate outbound traffic” (2011, p. 2).
When faced with large-scale disasters, cities in the Gulf Coast region of the United States have
used contraflow effectively. Xie, Waller, & Kockelman (2011) review a dense history of analysis
pertaining to the use of contraflow. They consider not only contraflow but also minimizing
instances of cross traffic flow (e.g., at intersections) to improve evacuation capacity.
The feasibility of using contraflow within CAL EMA Region IV is a hotly debated subject. We
use our model to quantify the potential differences in evacuation behavior when contraflow is
used, including obeying specific restrictions on where and how much contraflow can be used.
2.5 How Do Analysts Represent Highway Traffic?
Finally, the way in which traffic is represented in an evacuation is a major contributing factor
in the decision on how to model an evacuation. In an evacuation which uses highways, ve-
hicles are the primary means of conveying the population to safety. Assumptions about the
relationship between traffic and highway capacity can impact the modeling one uses to analyze
an evacuation. There are two primary ways of approaching this challenge.
2.5.1 Microscopic Models
The first type of model starts with a belief that individual vehicles and their interactions or
behaviors have an impact on the overall evacuation; these assumptions result in what is known
as a microscopic model. “These models usually consider detailed individual parameters such
as traveling speed, reaction time, and interaction outcomes of each evacuee with others during
the evacuation” (Ardekani et al., 2006, p. 613). Examples of microscopic evacuation models
include Langford (2010) and some of the work reviewed in Santos & Aguirre (2005), but there
are important differences.
Mathematical programming formulation
One approach starts with an equation-based description of known relationships among system
states and events, which are often expressed in terms of objectives and constraints. These can
be deterministic or stochastic, and the goal of any individual formulation is to obtain a solution
that is not only feasible (i.e., satisfying all constraints) but also is provably better than the oth-
ers. Langford (2010) is not concerned with the sociological factors that impact evacuation; his
primary concern is how individual vehicles traverse a road network in an evacuation. Langford
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illustrates how a network flow model can be used to model a microscopic level of detail without
incorporating complications such as human behavior.
Simulation-based formulations
Simulation techniques are convenient for studying systems where sociological factors are in-
volved because these factors are difficult to quantify mathematically. Law (2007, p. 5) explains
that if a problem is so complex that it cannot be solved deterministically then, “the model must
be studied by means of simulation, i.e., numerically exercising the model for the inputs in ques-
tion to see how they affect the output measures of performance.” Santos & Aguirre provide
examples that use agent-based simulation to capture many such factors, which are often mod-
eled using “if-then” statements rather than aggregate equations.
2.5.2 Macroscopic Models
Macroscopic models typically evaluate evacuations as aggregate flows and do not account for
behavior on the individual level. These models “can produce tight lower bounds on the ex-
pected evacuation time and upper bounds on the number of people successfully evacuated”
(Ardekani et al., 2006, p. 613). Ardekani et al. (2006) use a macroscopic approach to hurri-
cane evacuations, and Yusoff et al. (2008) survey the strengths and weaknesses of various types
of macroscopic models. As above, these models also consist of both mathematical program-
ming and simulation formulations. Specifically, evacuation models presented by Ardekani et
al. (2006) use network flows to analyze hurricane evacuations, and Yusoff et al. (2008) provide
examples of macroscopic simulation models used for analyzing evacuations.
We present a macroscopic, mathematical programming formulation approach that focuses on
the evacuation at a strategic level in which vehicles are modeled as aggregate flows. We assume




To model a regional system of highways, we develop a network flow model. Ahuja, Magnanti,
& Orlin (1993, p. 24) define a network as “a graph whose nodes and/or arcs have associated
numerical values (typically, costs, capacities, and/or supplies and demands.” Networks exist
in many forms many of which are evident in our everyday lives; these systems include power
grids, water supply lines and transportation systems. We model the movement of vehicles over
highway segments as a system of network flows.
3.1 Notation
We follow the conventions in Ahuja et al. (1993) in defining the following terms. Let G =
(N,A) denote a graph where N is the set of nodes, indexed by p (alias q & n), and A is the set
of directed arcs (p, q). Let Xp,q denote the directed flow along arc (p, q) ∈ A. Let up,q and cp,q
denote the capacity and per-unit cost of flow along (p, q) ∈ A. Let b(p) denote the supply at
node p ∈ N (see Figure 3.1). We use the distance of a road segment as its cost. In our model
nodes are equivalent to highway junctions, ZIP code locations, and evacuation locations. Arcs






Figure 3.1: Dumbell graph representation illustrating flow from node p to node q.
3.1.1 Point Location Notation
We seek to make the data for our network as clear as possible by prefacing our nodes by the
type of node they represent. For example, Zone Improvement Plan (ZIP) code point locations
are indicated by starting with a “z” followed by their five-digit number. Highway junctions are
indicated by a “p” followed by two or three letters representing the county in which they reside
then followed by a three-digit representation of the highway number, immediately followed by
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the mile-marker. An underscore “ ” represents a decimal place for more accurate mile-marker
labels. As such ZIP code 95745 is thus “z95745” and a fictional highway junction on I-5 in San
Joaquin County located at mile-marker 15.5 is represented by “pSJ00515 5” in situations where
no decimal point is required the underscore is omitted. Evacuation points are distinct and do
not follow the conventions above, they are: “BayArea,” “PointsN,” “PointsE,” and “PointsS,”
together they represent the four cardinal directions and are generic to encapsulate all possible
evacuation destinations in their general direction. “BayArea” is distinct because all routes of
evacuation to the West lead directly to the Bay Area. A complete listing of our point locations
can be found in Tables A.1-A.5.
3.2 Building the Network
We follow guidance from CAL EMA Region IV and consider all state and federal highways
within Yolo, Sacramento, San Joaquin, and Stanislaus counties. Starting with a collection of
road networks extracted in 1990 from the U.S. Census Bureau’s Topologically Integrated Geo-
graphic Encoding & Referencing system (TIGER) shape files, we updated individual highway
segments with data extracted from geographical information software (GIS) shape files pro-
vided by California Department of Transportation (CALTRANS). The data for each highway
segment includes the distance, the number of lanes, as well as whether the highway is divided.
Reconciling the TIGER and the GIS data required considerable effort.
The first step in processing the CALTRANS data was to overlay it on the 20-year-old road data
to identify any obvious discrepancies. Figure 3.2 shows some distinct differences between the
two data sets. Specifically, some highways are not continuous from their apparent starting point
to their terminus. We manually augmented the CALTRANS data to correct these gaps.
Another issue with the CALTRANS data was the representation of highway junctions. For
purposes of GIS mapping, it is often sufficient to represent a highway junction by a crossing
of individual road segments. However, a network flow problem requires explicit intersections
for road junctions (node j in Figure 3.3.B), and we added these manually. After reconciling
the data we verified the result by taking a map of the area and then overlaying our constructed
network (Figure 3.4).
We then add one node for each evacuation point, selecting it based upon the general direction
that the various highways travel. The final evacuation points include one node for the Bay Area
in the west, and one node for each of the remaining cardinal directions. We place each on the
14


















 County Boundary 
Figure 3.2: State and Federal Highways in Yolo, Sacramento, San Joaquin and Stanislaus counties. Dashed lines
are TIGER data set, solid lines are CALTRANS data.
map at a distance far enough from the main highway network so as to be visually obvious, but
we do not assign a distance to these notional highway segments. Reaching any of the nodes
adjacent to an evacuation point is therefore equivalent to actually evacuating.
The last main input to our model is population data, which we obtain via one of two methods
available through the U.S. Census Bureau; five-digit ZIP codes or Census tracks. Census tracks
provide a higher level of fidelity than ZIP codes but are not as easily recognized by citizens.



















































A) Crossing arcs 
without interaction
Figure 3.3: Two crossing arcs without interaction (A), junction representation (B)
as well as the population at large. Rather than attempting to draw the geographical region for
each ZIP code we use the geographical center of the ZIP code, aka ZIP code centroid, as a
supply node (see Figure 3.5). Finally, we connect the ZIP code to the four nearest highway
segments (not shown on Figure 3.5). This provides a general representation for a diversity of
local access roads and highway on-ramps.
3.3 Model Assumptions
We develop a single commodity network flow model to evaluate the amount of time required
for the at-risk populations to evacuate. This is similar to the Rough Cut Capacity Plan model of
Ardekani et al. (2006).
1. We assume that the complete schedule of highway inundations (locations and times) is
known with certainty in advance.
2. We assume that people evacuate when informed to do so and that highways are devoid of
traffic until the evacuation is ordered.
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Legend 
 Highway Junction   
            Highway Segment 
  Evacuation Point   
Figure 3.4: Map with constructed network overlaid on the highways in Region IV.
3. We assume that congestion is captured in the capacity of each highway segment in vehi-
cles per hour.
4. We assume that the only thing preventing a population from evacuating is road capacity. If
an evacuation route has enough capacity to carry a vehicle during an epoch (three hours
for this analysis), then we assume the vehicle has enough time to do so. Furthermore,
we assume that the entire populations has access to a vehicle and can evacuate without
assistance.
5. We assume that people will evacuate on local highways and not along county roads.
6. We assume people know their neighborhoods well enough to find routes to access the
highway. In our model, each ZIP code can access the highway by four separate routes.
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Legend 
      Highway Junction   
            Highway Segment 
  Evacuation Point  
  ZIP Code 
Figure 3.5: Final road network with ZIP codes.
7. We assume that highway on-ramps do not restrict the ultimate evacuation behavior, and
we model the capacity of each arc connecting ZIP codes to the highway network with suf-
ficiently high capacity (i.e., 10,000 vehicles/hour) so that they do not cause bottlenecks.




We present the complete mathematical formulation MINATRISK to solve the single commodity
problem.
Index Use [∼ cardinality]
p ∈ P point location (alias n, q) [∼ 333]
g ∈ G ⊆ P safe destination point location(s) [∼ 4]
t ∈ T time epoch (an ordered set), in T [∼ 10 – 20], where tF is the final epoch
(p, q) ∈ A set of all arcs (p, q) in A [∼600]
(p, q, t) ∈ R undirected road segment between p and q in epoch t [∼ 450]
(p, q, t) ∈ S directed road segment from p to q in epoch t [∼ 250]
(p, q) ∈ S =⇒
{
(p, q) ∈ R
∣∣∣
p<q





inundation scheduletp a list of highway junctions scheduled to be flooded in epoch t > 1
captp,q capacity for evacuee flow during epoch t over directed arc
(p, q) ∈ S [vehicles] (This can be computed as an arbitrary
function of exogenous data, or tabulated.)
distp,q distance from point p to point q [miles]
evactp supply of evacuees from point location p at the start of epoch t [people]
evac popt total population successfully evacuated in t [people]
reversiblep,q indicator of the ability to reverse a segment of highway{
1, if arc(p, q) is reversible
0, otherwise




pax per vehicle estimated number of passengers per vehicle [people]
strand pen penalty incurred for each stranded person in epoch tF
ave disttp,q average miles traveled by evacuees [miles/person]
pax per vehicle distp,q
evac popt
contramiles maximum number of contraflow miles authorized in the evacuation [miles]
Decision Variables [units]
X tp,q directed flow of traffic on arc (p, q) ∈ S during epoch t [vehicles]
F tn evacuees frustrated at point location n at the end of epoch t [people]






























− F t−1n ∣∣∣
t>1
+F tn = evac
t
n ∀n ∈ P, t ∈ T (3.2)
X tp,q ≤ captp,q(1− Vp,q) + captq,p(Vq,p) ∀(p, q) ∈ S, t ∈ T(3.3)





distq,pVq,p ≤ contramiles ∀(p, q) ∈ R (3.5)
X tp,q ≥ 0 ∀(p, q) ∈ S, t ∈ T(3.6)
F tn ≥ 0 ∀n ∈ P, t ∈ T (3.7)
Vp,q ∈ {0, 1} ∀(p, q) ∈ S, t ∈ T(3.8)
MINATRISK Discussion
This is a single-commodity minimum cost network flow model with periodic state review and
time epochs long enough that any person trying to evacuate has enough time within any sin-
gle epoch to reach any safe destination point, provided sufficient road capacity. The objective
function (3.1) minimizes the number of frustrated and stranded evacuees as well as the average
distance traveled by evacuees by the end of the evacuation time horizon. Balance of flows con-
straint (3.2) accounts for flows into and out of a point location during a time epoch. Such flows
include persons unable to reach a safe destination point within an epoch, and thus frustrated re-
main in place until the next epoch. Constraint (3.3) governs directed flow on a road segment that
may be influenced by a decision to reverse a normal traffic flow direction. Constraint (3.4) al-
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lows at most one direction reversal decision for each road segment. Contraflow constraint (3.5)
defines the maximum allowed miles of contraflow which may be used. Stipulations (3.6)–(3.8)
define decision variable domains.
3.4.1 MINDIST Shortest Path Model
The flows in formulation MINATRISK are a consequence of the labels distlabeln that “drive”
evacuees toward safe locations. We obtain these labels by solving a separate shortest path
network problem.
To accomplish this, we create an artificial node SINK ∈ N . We create artificial arcs (g, SINK) ∈
A with distg,SINK = 0, ∀g ∈ G. We define a new decision variable Yp,q,n to represent the flow

















1, if, p = n
0, if, p 6= {n, SINK}
−1, if, p = SINK
(3.10)
Yp,q,n ≥ 0 ∀(p, q) ∈ A (3.11)
Finally, we set distlabeln =
∑
(p,q)∈A
Y ∗p,q,n ∀n ∈ N , where Y ∗ is the set of optimal flows
resulting from formulation MINDIST.
3.4.2 Additional Details
In order to perform detailed accounting of flows and generate customized reports we also in-
clude the following:
Index Use [∼ cardinality]
z ∈ Z ZIP code [∼ 110]
z(p) ZIP code of point location p [∼ 110]
e ∈ E ⊆ P dynamic set of evacuated locations [∼ 50 – 100]
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c ∈ C county [∼ 5]
Given Data [units]
latp, lonp coordinates of point location [degrees]
popp population of point location p [people]
With these, we can produce reports that, for example, keep track of the movement of evacuees
county-by-county per time period. This kind of information is particularly useful for emergency
planners at the county-level who setup Evacuation Control and Assistance Points (ECAPs) that
provide food, water, and vehicular assistance to evacuees.
23




CAL EMA Region IV has many possible evacuation scenarios, however we narrow our focus
to a specific few to illustrate key features of the region and our model. We first establish a
“base case” and then apply our models to analyze differences in the evacuation behavior for
each scenario.
4.1 Establishing the Base Case
To understand how the highway network reacts under various what-if scenarios, we first define
a base case and evaluate it under two different scenarios. The base case considers evacuation
where no contraflow is utilized. This is commensurate with current California Highway Patrol’s
(CHP) Standard Operating Procedures (SOP). We also assume that no highway segments are
closed due to flooding or accident. This base case allows us to analyze the optimal performance
under current SOP. We apply this case to two specific scenarios. The first scenario is a situation
in which all ZIP codes within Sacramento County must evacuate, we refer to this scenario as
the Sacramento County scenario, or simply as Sacramento County. In the second, we apply the
base case to a scenario where all ZIP codes along rivers within the four counties must evacuate,
we refer to this scenario as the River-Side scenario or simply as River-Side.
4.2 SCENARIO: Sacramento County
As stated previously, this scenario forces the evacuation of all ZIP codes within Sacramento
County. We select this scenario because Sacramento County is the most densely populated
county of the four considered, with approximately 1,182,491 residents (U.S. Census Bureau,
2000). The evacuation of this many people will quickly saturate the highway network and
allow us to analyze how it performs under high-demand situations. We then manipulate the
parameters of the model to generate changes to the scenario.
4.2.1 Run Profiles
We manipulate parameters to influence the evacuation results from our model. For each run of
the model we vary the number of passengers per vehicle (pax per vehicle) also referred to as
PPV, from PPV=1 to PPV=4 incrementing by half a passenger with each iteration. Additionally,
we change the maximum number of authorized contraflow miles (contramiles), or CFM, from
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CFM=200 down to CFM=0 reducing it by 50 with each iteration. By doing this we are able to
analyze the effect these parameters have on each scenario. We start with the base case applied
to each of the two scenarios and then constrain them, this results in the following profiles:
1. Base cases for both scenarios
2. Loss of the ability to evacuate to PointsE
3. Loss of the ability to evacuate to BayArea
4. Highway I-5 inundated at San Joaquin mile-markers 15, 20 and the CA-120/I-5 inter-
change
5. Highway CA-99 inundated at San Joaquin mile-markers 6, 9, and the CA-120/CA-99
interchange
6. Both highways I-5 and CA-99 inundated at the mile-markers listed above
7. Highway I-5 inundated as before with the addition of losing the ability to evacuate to
PointsE
These combinations result in 490 distinct evacuation scenarios.
4.2.2 Results
We formulate our model MINATRISK using General Algebraic Modeling System aka GAMS
(GAMS, 2010) and solve each evacuation scenario to within 0.1% of optimality using CPLEX
12.02 (ILOG, 2007) on a personal computer with an Intel Xeon CPU at 3.16 GHz. The compu-
tation time to solve each scenario depends on the model parameters, including the road closures,
if any, the number of passengers per vehicle, and total contraflow miles; resulting in a range of
five seconds for an individual scenario to 41 minutes with 35 scenarios solved in a single run.
Table 4.1 is a partial listing of results from a single run of the model. It lists PPV and CFM at
the top and reports arrivals of evacuees by epoch to each one of the evacuation points, followed
by the number of stranded people still waiting to evacuate at the end of the epoch. It reports if
anyone is stranded, how many miles of contraflow were used and finally reports the cumulative
number of evacuees at each evacuation point in every time period. We also produce county-wise
reports, provide distance information and measure highway segment utility which is used for
graphing the evacuation over time.
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Table 4.1: Example of output for evac sp tot.csv. The last column indicates the table continues to the right, one
column per additional epoch.
pax per vehicle= 1 contramiles= 200
Evacuations by time period
t1 t2 t3 t4 · · ·
BayArea 45000 42231 42000 · · ·
PointsN 30000 30000 30000 · · ·
PointsE 48000 48000 48000 · · ·
PointsS 18000 18000 18000 · · ·
Frustrated 1041491 903260 765260 · · ·
Stranded 0 0 0 · · ·
Contraflow miles 135.8 135.8 135.8 · · ·
Cumulative evacuations by time period
BayArea 45000 87231 129231 · · ·
PointsN 30000 60000 90000 · · ·
PointsE 48000 96000 144000 · · ·
PointsS 18000 36000 54000 · · ·
Using the data from Tables A.6–A.9 in the Appendix we generate Figure 4.1. Figure 4.1 depicts
the rate that evacuees reach exit points. From this figure we can see that people evacuate in the
shortest amount of time when they travel together. In Figure 4.1, we observe that the PPV=4
case evacuates fastest, which is to be expected, while the PPV=1 case takes evacuees more than
three times as long to evacuate.
Assumptions about the number of passengers per vehicle
We observe this trend consistently over multiple scenarios and therefore conclude that the num-
ber of passengers traveling in an evacuating vehicle can greatly influence evacuation times. The
average family size in Sacramento is 2.57 people (U.S. Census Bureau, 2000). In the remaining
analysis, we assume people will travel with other evacuees but will at times be greedy and take
more than one vehicle. We conservatively assume PPV=2 anytime we discuss evacuation rates
and times unless specifically mentioned otherwise.
Based on the results above, an evacuation of Sacramento County, assuming CHP’s SOP and
barring any highway interruptions, will take an estimated 21 hours for all evacuees to reach an
evacuation point. This is a best case scenario: evacuees behave according to a central planner
(our model) who tells them exactly where and when to go so that the overall evacuation is
optimized. Table 4.2 presents the details for the number and percentage of people reaching
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Figure 4.1: With no contraflow available to increase the rate that people depart, the importance of carpooling
becomes clear. The legend notation depicts the number of passengers per vehicle followed by the number of
contraflow miles used.
the various evacuation points. From this table we observe that 23% of the population travels
North, 33% to the Bay Area, 44% to the East and 0% travel South. To understand why evacuees
do not travel South recall that our objective function (3.1) minimizes the number of stranded
and frustrated people in the network as well as minimizes the average distance evacuees travel.
This means, for example, that evacuees traveling South along I-5 will fill I-5 to capacity in
Sacramento County but turn off I-5 onto another highway to minimize the distance they travel
to evacuate from the region. They will find and take the shortest path to the closest evacuation
point. In Figure 4.2 we observe that the southern portion of the regions highways are not utilized
by evacuees. If our objective function were adjusted to give preference to major highways over
state highways, the flow patterns would change, but the basic results would not.
4.2.3 Considering Contraflow
Having established a baseline, we consider the use of contraflow. Figure 4.3 depicts evacuation
clearing times for PPV combinations and depicts a range from CFM=0 to CFM=200. From this
figure we see that there is no benefit to the use of contraflow when PPV=4. The greatest benefit
28
Table 4.2: Summary of evacuation results by evacuation point (in percentage and population) assuming PPV=2 and
CFM=0. In these scenarios all evacuees were able to evacuate.
Case PointsN PointsS BayArea PointsE
23% 0% 33% 44%Sacramento County
276,000 people 0 people 389,413 people 517,078 people
37% 8% 55% 0%Loss of PointsE
432,000 people 98,004 people 652,487 people 0 people
Loss of PointsE 39% 13% 48% 0%
& I-5 462,000 people 158,004 people 561,231 people 0 people
32% 15% 0% 53%Loss of BayArea
384,000 people 175,797 people 0 people 622,694 people
23% 4% 27% 46%Loss of I-5
276,000 people 48,000 people 317,413 people 541,078 people
23% 0% 33% 44%CA-99
27,000 people 0 people 395,413 people 517,078 people
Loss of CA-99 24% 0% 28% 48%
& I-5 288,000 people 0 people 332,312 people 562,179 people
18% 21% 25% 36%River-Side Evacuation
210,000 people 233,232 people 283,402 people 408,000 people
29% 31% 40% 0%Loss of PointsE
324,000 people 351,207 people 459,427 people 0 people
Loss of PointsE 33% 24% 43% 0%
& I-5 378,000 people 274,326 people 482,308 people 0 people
28% 24% 0% 48%Loss of Bay Area
324,000 people 351,207 people 0 people 459,427 people
19% 17% 27% 37%Loss of I-5
216,000 people 195,207 people 298,688 people 424,739 people
18% 21% 25% 36%Loss of CA-99
199,119 people 243,207 people 278,308 people 414,000 people
Loss of CA-99 19% 17% 27% 37%
& I-5 216,000 people 195,207 people 298,688 people 424,739 people
of contraflow comes in the case of PPV=1, and this reduces clearing times by nine hours. This
benefit drops to six hours as PPV increases by an additional half passenger, and decreases to
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Figure 4.2: This depicts the capacity utilization of the various highways in the region as Sacramento County evac-
uees depart the region in the first epoch.
4.2.4 An Imperfect Evacuation
The previously described scenario describes a perfect evacuation. Reality tells us to stress
the evacuation in more realistic ways. Consequently, we run several “what-if” scenarios as
described above. We next envision a scenario in which evacuees cannot evacuate to either
PointsE or BayArea.
Loss of PointsE
We imagine a situation where rain and melting snow cause a deluge of runoff from the mountain
region. This runoff washes out roads and causes mud-slides. Snow at higher elevations makes
high-mountain passes impassible and thus evacuation to PointsE no longer possible. Figure 4.4
shows the resulting rate of evacuees arriving at other evacuation points when they cannot go
east. Table 4.2 illustrates the changes in the evacuation; 156,000 additional people evacuate to
PointsN, 98,000 extra evacuees travel to PointsS, and an additional 263,000 drive to BayArea.
We again consider the potential benefit of using contraflow. Figure 4.5 shows that contraflow
helps in the situation where evacuees average PPV=1 and this decreases clearing times by six
hours with the use of CFM≥150. Interestingly, we also observe that the use of CFM=50 in-
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Figure 4.3: Evacuation clearing times comparing the use of contraflow combinations with various passenger com-
binations. The greatest benefit of contraflow comes when evacuees are one to a vehicle. As PPV increases the
benefit of contraflow decreases.
creases clearing times from 54 hours to 60 hours with contraflow established on a small seg-
ment of CA-99, north of Sacramento. In this case, our model chooses to use contraflow to push
additional vehicles to the edge of the highway network. But, because the capacity of the road
segment inbound to the evacuation point is small it then takes several additional time periods for
these evacuees to reach safety. The net savings in the cost of frustrated passengers outweighs the
cost of additional time periods. This type of trade-off is inherent to our cost-based formulation,
and while it sometimes produces results that seem unnatural they are mathematically correct.
Loss of BayArea
We also analyze loss of the ability to evacuate people west to the San Francisco Bay Area.
Much concern about flooding in the region revolves around the levee system and the risk of
their failure during a major earthquake. The geologic faults which run through this portion of
the Central Valley of California have not shifted in over 11,000 years (California Department of
Conservation, 2011). Assuming the earthquake does not originate from one of these old faults,
then it would likely come from one of the faults that run through the Bay Area. To cause such
extensive damage this earthquake would need to be of such an amazing magnitude that the Bay
Area would almost certainly have evacuation issues of its own, thus making evacuations from
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Sacramento Evacuation: 
Loss of Points E 
Figure 4.4: The rate that evacuees reach available evacuation points drops by over 100,000 people/hour if PointsE
are lost as an evacuation location. Evacuation times increase six hours as a result for PPV=2, 18 hours for PPV=1.
the Central Valley impossible.
The impact caused by losing the ability to evacuate to BayArea is not as great as the loss of
PointsE (see Figure 4.6) and does not increase evacuation times. From Table 4.2 we determine
that of the 33% of people who evacuated to BayArea in the base case, 9% travel to PointsN,
15% to PointsS and an additional 9% to PointsE. Of the many cases we examine, the loss of
BayArea results in the largest number of people traveling to PointsS (175,800 people) and to
PointsE (622,700 people).
We observe that contraflow is most beneficial for the case of PPV=1 with clearing times eased
by six hours, but the benefit is only three hours when PPV=1.5 (see Figure 4.7).
Highway Inundations
Note that inundation scheduletp in our model defines a schedule of inundated point locations,
e.g., inundation scheduletp = popp,∀(p, t) ∈ inundatedtp. We assume that each point loca-
tion in inundatedtp will be inundated at most once, and that in time epochs following such an
inundation, all road segments incident to an inundated point location would be lost. That is to
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Figure 4.5: The optimal use of contraflow can hinder evacuations. Here CFM=50 causes an increase in clearing
times in the PPV=1 scenario. Again, contraflow provides the greatest assistance to clearance times in the PPV=1
scenario with the use of CFM=200.
say, inundation scheduletp > 0 =⇒ capτp,q = capτq,p = 0,∀τ > t.
We select highway segments from I-5 and CA-99 in such as manner as to create a cut-set when
used together. This cut-set has the impact of preventing any flow from traveling to PointsS from
any points north of the cut, and is similar to highway closures experienced in the flood of 1997.
Table A.11 provides a specific listing of which highway segments were inundated during which
epoch.
As one might expect, we find that the Sacramento County evacuation does not differ in a sig-
nificant way from the base case scenario when the highway inundations are much further south
than the evacuating populations (see Table 4.2).
During a hypothetical inundation of I-5 and the loss of PointsE, we observe that many evacuees
access BayArea through routes off I-5. Further, the combination of the loss of I-5 and PointsE
drive evacuating populations to take different routes (see Figures 4.8 & 4.9). Despite these
obstacles, when we compare this evacuation to the case where PointsE is lost, we find the
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Figure 4.6: Here we observe that the rates of evacuees in the PPV=4 case evacuates almost 100,000 more people
per epoch than the loss of PointsE scenario, but rates remain below the evacuation rate of the base case.
difference in populations at the evacuation points are; 2% more evacuate to PointsN (creating
the largest demand at PointsN of all our scenarios), 5% more go South, 7% fewer people travel
to BayArea.
4.3 SCENARIO: River-Side Evacuation
Given the history of flooding in the region presented in Chapter 1, we model an evacuation
scenario more commensurate with historical precedence. Very special circumstances would be
required to force all of Sacramento County to evacuate while the other counties nearby remain
unaffected. Therefore, we select a set of ZIP codes which border major rivers within the region,
and name this set of ZIP codes “River-Side”. As demonstrated in the 1997 floods, communities
closest to rivers are usually impacted to the greatest degree when levees fail or are crested.
With this scenario we analyze the impact on the highway network of an evacuation of similar
size to Sacramento County (50 ZIP codes with approximately 1,134,634 million residents (U.S.
Census Bureau, 2000)) but spread over a larger area.
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Figure 4.7: Again the addition of contraflow provides only a three hour improvement on evacuation times in the
PPV=2 case.
4.3.1 Run Profiles
As with Sacramento County, we run all the same scenarios on the River-Side case. This allows
us to compare the effects of evacuating a highly populated region with an evacuation where the
population is spread over a greater area.
4.3.2 Results
The River-Side evacuation scenario results in faster evacuation than the Sacramento County
scenario (see Tables A.8 & A.9). Further, we observe that evacuees are more evenly distributed
across the possible evacuation locations with 18% arriving to PointsN, 21% to PointsS, 25% to
BayArea, and 36% to PointsE. In the case of PPV=2 and CFM=0, evacuees evacuate nine hours
earlier than the Sacramento County case, in as few as 12 hours versus 21 hours (see Figure
4.10). This is to be expected, as each evacuation node has a significant number of evacuees that
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Figure 4.8: Sacramento County evacuees flow through the highway network with the loss of PointsE in epoch one
prior to the inundation of I-5.
4.3.3 Considering Contraflow
After the mediocre improvements contraflow provided in the Sacramento County case, we again
evaluate contraflow to see if it assists evacuees departing the area. Figure 4.11 portrays a more
restricted view of contraflow than observed in the Sacramento County evacuation. At PPV=1,
where one would expect to see the greatest impact, contraflow does not provide any relief,
indicating the greatest easing of clearing times results from an increase in PPV.
4.3.4 An Imperfect Evacuation
We submit the base case River-Side evacuation to several “what-if” scenarios to understand
how the evacuation will progress under stress.
Loss of PointsE
As before the loss of PointsE greatly impacts the rate at which evacuees reach safety and in-
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Figure 4.9: Sacramento County evacuees detour around inundated highways and most of those detoured evacuate
South.
Loss of BayArea
While losing the ability to evacuate to the Bay Area does increase the amount of time to evacuate
the population, the network is able to evacuate 50,000 more evacuees per epoch than the PointsE
scenario.
Highway Inundations
We systematically inundate the same highways as before in the second epoch. We find that
because of the distributed nature of the evacuation locations these highway inundation schedules
have a minimal impact on evacuation efforts. At most only 4% or 45,000 people of the overall
population are affected.
However, in the situation where I-5 is inundated and PointsE is lost, the evacuation forces people
to evacuate North and West to the Bay Area. As compared to the scenario where PointsE was
unavailable as an evacuation location this evacuation results in 4% more people traveling to
PointsN, 7% fewer traveling to PointsS, and 3% more to BayArea.
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River-Side Evacuation 
Figure 4.10: Evacuation rates for the River-Side evacuation show an amazing increase in the number of people
able to evacuate per epoch. PPV=2 increases by 100,000 people per epoch compared to the Sacramento County
evacuation.
Figure 4.11: Contraflow results for the River-Side base case evacuation. This graph shows that contraflow only
helps in some scenarios and only eases clearing times by three hours.
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Figure 4.12: Evacuation rates for PPV=2 decrease by 100,000 people per epoch compared to the base case and
increase clearing times by six hours.
Figure 4.13: Evacuation rates for PPV=2 decrease by 50,000 people per epoch compared to the base case and
increase clearing times by six hours.
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Figure 4.14: Contraflow does not significantly improve River-Side evacuation clearing times in the event of the Bay
Area being cut off to evacuees.
4.4 Is Contraflow Worth the Effort?
Undeniably, Emergency Services would face a daunting challenge to set up contraflow in a
region not pre designed for it. It would require teams at every on-ramp and off-ramp to direct
traffic in the appropriate direction. But the ultimate question remains, is the amount of effort
required to force a contraflow plan worth the increased clearing times of evacuees?
4.4.1 What We Expected
As modelers, we fully expected that contraflow would provide significant help to evacuees in
reaching evacuation points since it represents a “relaxation” of the capacity limits on segments
that have contraflow established. In some instances, contraflow did improve clearing times
specifically where more densely populated areas were required to evacuate. But, the results
were not as dramatic as we expected. Given the greatest benefit in clearing times is three to
six hours and only in instances where PPV=1, we therefore conclude that the level of effort to
set-up the contraflow should be spent elsewhere. With that said, we believe that preplanning of
evacuation routes warrants further evaluation for the area since the region has so many possible
routes that evacuees may take. It is important to route evacuees through areas with bottlenecks
as effectively as possible to minimize evacuation times. This will allow for more effective
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pre-staging of relief supplies.
4.4.2 Analysis and Verification
In order to validate our findings that contraflow provides little benefit to the River-Side evacu-
ation, we enable the use of contraflow on arcs inbound to evacuation points. We then run the
scenario again and find the solution remains the same.
4.5 Insights
4.5.1 Bottlenecks
Our results led to other questions, such as why, in some scenarios, did evacuees not saturate
all possible routes leading to the evacuation points? We find that in both evacuation scenarios
the evacuating populations funnel through multiple bottlenecks which constrict capacity and the
number of vehicles per hour which can traverse that highway network. Once past the bottle-
neck, evacuees are not restricted by capacity because the sum of the available capacity past the
bottleneck is greater than the capacity restriction they just traversed.
Further to the south on I-5, capacity is not used in the Sacramento County base case because
the model routes evacuees through the network to minimize their distance they traveled. Figure
4.8 depicts evacuation of Sacramento County without the ability to evacuate people to the East.
Capacity constraints in the highways also limit the number of people who are able to evacuate
to the North. In Figure 4.8, observe how dark the highway segments are North and West of
the I-5/CA-99 split this indicates these arcs are at capacity. Also note that there are highways
that are not used in the northwest, this is because people can only evacuate to PointsN if they
traverse two highway segments: I-80 west of Sacramento or I-5 north of downtown. Figures
4.15 & 4.16 illustrate the results of these two cuts on the resulting evacuation. This also is a key
insight as to why the model routes so few evacuees to PointsN.
4.5.2 Importance of Evacuation to the East and the Bay Area
Table 4.3 shows the capacity per hour of the highway network for flows leaving the region.
From this data one can understand why so many evacuees traveled where they did. Again, our
model minimized the average distance traveled by each evacuee as well as minimized those
stranded and frustrated. In run after run, PointsE received the majority of the evacuees, this
is due in part to the ZIP codes we selected to evacuate and also to the fact that there is more





Highway Segment Cut 
Figure 4.15: The baseline Sacramento County scenario. We add two cuts.
Table 4.3: Evacuation capacity from Yolo, Sacramento, San Joaquin, & Stanislaus counties into each of the evacu-
ation points per hour.
BayArea PointsN PointsE PointsS
15000 10000 17000 16000
The Bay Area was important to the Sacramento County evacuation, receiving the second highest
number of evacuees. Together, BayArea and PointsE received 77% of the evacuees in the
Sacramento base case. This number dropped to 61% in the River-Side base case, with over
1/3 of the population evacuating East. However, loss of the Bay Area did not change overall
evacuation times during the Sacramento County evacuation. This indicates sufficient capacity





Highway Segment Cut 
Figure 4.16: The affects of these two cuts are evident in the resulting figure, all ability to evacuate to the North is
severed.
4.5.3 Impacts of Flooded Highways
While flooded highways can cause a nuisance to those who live locally or who travel to a spe-
cific destination, they are not always factors in limiting the ability to evacuate. Our model
assumes perfect information, or advance knowledge of which highways will flood and when.
As a result, it pre-plans and routes evacuees in such a manner as to prevent large interruptions in
evacuations. In this sense our model provides a “best-case” solution with reference to clearing
times. We do not believe that such a model is unreasonable for this region because nearly all
highways are elevated and segments of highways which are not elevated are known to emer-
gency services. And while a sudden flooding of these low-lying highways would cause traffic
headaches, these inundations would not prevent a regional population from evacuating.
43




We conclude this study by summarizing our results making a few recommendations and propos-
ing several ideas for future research on this topic.
5.1 Summary
We developed two models to identify optimal evacuation routes as well as quantify highway de-
mands during an evacuation in Yolo, Sacramento, San Joaquin and Stanislaus counties. MINA-
TRISK is a single commodity minimum cost network flow model, and MINDIST is a shortest
path optimization model which identifies the shortest path from every node in the network to
every one of the possible evacuation points. We represent the system of highways in Region IV
as a network with ZIP codes providing a supply of evacuees, transshipment nodes as highway
junctions, and arcs represent highway segments.
We establish a base case developed using CHP’s Standard Operating Procedure which does not
allow for contraflow, and apply this case to two baseline scenarios. These scenarios differ only
in the subset of ZIP codes which are directed to evacuate in the first epoch. Our model indicates
that it is possible to evacuate approximately 1.2 million people from Sacramento County and
River-Side evacuations in 24 hours and 15 hours respectively. We find that the shortest route for
most evacuees is to travel to evacuation locations to the East and in the Bay Area. We find that
loss of PointsE increases evacuation clearing times by 25% in the Sacramento County scenario
and 40% in the River-Side scenario, while the loss of the Bay Area does not.
We adjust parameters in the model to cause highway inundations and allow for the use of con-
traflow. Inundating highways did not substantially change evacuation results however, the inun-
dation of I-5 combined with the loss of PointsE did cause more people to travel to PointsS in the
River-Side evacuation than in any other scenario. Furthermore, because we assume two passen-
gers per vehicle, we find people evacuate six hours faster with the use of contraflow. However,
because the evacuation of Sacramento County in its entirety is unlikely, and the River-Side
evacuation more plausible, we find that our model and the analysis of its results does not sup-




As illustrated in the bottleneck discussion, severe limitations exist in the ability for the region to
evacuate people to the north. Additional capacity in selected locations would alleviate conges-
tion and provide a more robust evacuation network enabling evacuees from Sacramento County
to depart the county faster.
Concerns over highway inundations can be eased by elevating known highways susceptible to
flooding. While not a trivial task, doing so can ensure evacuees are able to depart the region
over a longer period of time without fear of being cut off from safety. Elevating highways also
provides the added benefit of acting as a flood barrier, a second levee, for emergency services
to use to halt flooding.
5.3 Future Work
5.3.1 Defining a Realistic Inundation Schedule
Several State and Federal agencies have expressed interest in this work, specifically CHP and the
U.S. Geological Survey (USGS). Specifically, USGS has worked extensively on understanding
natural disasters in California designing a model of a “worst-case” storm and flooding scenario
known as an “ARkStorm” which is based on the storm which flooded the region in the 1860s
(Porter & 39 More, 2011). Their extensive work has identified likely highway closures due to
mud-slides, etc. this work should be included into this model to scale to an ARkStorm scenario.
5.3.2 Defining Specific Evacuation Destinations
Local experts in evacuations stated early in our research their belief that people tend to travel to
places where others live, and that demand is proportional to the population of the destinations.
We believe a multi-commodity MINATRISK would provide greater insight into the flows on
highways in the region. Such a model would force neighbors to compete for highway capacity
in order to reach their respective destinations.
5.3.3 Background Noise
One of our big assumptions revolved around highway capacity: we assumed highways were
empty until an evacuation was declared. This can be related to an evacuation in the middle of
the night. However, to model an evacuation during the day one would need to include some
level of background noise on the highways. We could change our model and reduce capacity
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on highways in proportion to the population which lives in the adjacent ZIP codes. This would
include more realism as not all evacuations occur at night.
5.3.4 On-ramps and Off-ramps
Our model did not constrain evacuees entering the highway. We assumed a constant on-ramp
capacity as well as assumed each ZIP code could access the nearest highways at exactly four
locations. We could change our model to scale the number of on-ramps based on the population
of the ZIP code it services. Our idea is that locations with larger populations are likely to have
more on-ramps that service that population and the same could be said for the capacity of those
ramps. This would allow for a better estimate of people stranded in their ZIP code because of
inability to access the highway within a specified epoch due to capacity constraints.
5.4 Final Thoughts
As observed in Langford (2010, p. 39):
Over the last few decades, there has been a trend that people migrate toward areas
that are disaster prone (e.g., coastal areas, urban wildland interface areas). This
suggests that evacuations will become increasingly common as more people inhabit
these areas. As such, understanding when to order an evacuation, how long to allow
for an evacuation, and how to route individuals in an evacuation will be important
for public safety officials....
Recent tragic events such as the Japanese earthquake, tsunami and evacuations over nuclear
concerns, and the earthquake in Christchurch, New Zealand illustrate the importance of under-
standing how people and infrastructure will respond to inordinate situations and demands. To
that end we offer our MINATRISK model for optimized highway network evacuation to emer-
gency planners as an additional tool for them to use to gain deeper insights. We provide our
analysis on Region IV’s system of highways as evidence of the types of analysis which can
result from the use of our model.
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Table A.1: node location.csv data (headers provided for context)
Node Longitude Latitude Node Longitude Latitude
BayArea -122.2816 37.8243 PointsE -120.7063 38.8912
PointsN -122.1246 39.1168 PointsS -120.367 36.9527
pSAC0050 018 -121.4481118 38.25486921 pSAC00511 608 -121.4862576 38.42001103
pSAC00514 308 -121.4946562 38.45860943 pSAC00517 185 -121.5166734 38.49553766
pSAC00518 651 -121.5221494 38.51615386 pSAC00522 565 -121.5110804 38.56829689
pSAC00525 526 -121.5093983 38.60887364 pSAC00530 5 -121.5500401 38.67105418
pSAC00532 734 -121.5908633 38.67110471 pSAC0054 645 -121.465531 38.32055494
pSAC0120 -121.6854718 38.15969638 pSAC0126 2 -121.5794097 38.12569116
pSAC01611 342 -121.2447603 38.5063045 pSAC01611 366 -121.2443323 38.50621518
pSAC01614 066 -121.1959046 38.49682135 pSAC01614 094 -121.1954099 38.49670129
pSAC01619 48 -121.0986485 38.49638425 pSAC0162 53 -121.3989866 38.54708399
pSAC01621 784 -121.0595314 38.48572655 pSAC01623 81 -121.0274799 38.48081432
pSAC01623 948 -121.0244877 38.48082702 pSAC0164 202 -121.3702544 38.53860164
pSAC0166 22 -121.3349325 38.52900486 pSAC0168 342 -121.2978598 38.51889221
pSAC0500 -121.5158707 38.57146136 pSAC05012 469 -121.2709297 38.60897174
pSAC05012 496 -121.2704951 38.60913087 pSAC05015 759 -121.2171043 38.63090997
pSAC05019 41 -121.1532786 38.64199233 pSAC0502 507 -121.4735044 38.55887761
pSAC0504 307 -121.441944 38.55591624 pSAC0506 084 -121.409214 38.55364849
pSAC0507 734 -121.3794968 38.55886163 pSAC0509 505 -121.3081677 38.57855913
pSAC0513 397 -121.4432931 38.5975463 pSAC0514 743 -121.4268317 38.61124123
pSAC0515 498 -121.419661 38.6200844 pSAC0800 -121.5478715 38.5984408
pSAC08010 943 -121.3781256 38.64617082 pSAC08012 452 -121.3605397 38.66076533
pSAC08012 476 -121.3602413 38.6610301 pSAC08014 393 -121.3373924 38.68233906
pSAC0802 554 -121.5172262 38.62512918 pSAC0805 363 -121.4706082 38.64166292
pSAC09910 07 -121.362163 38.37637112 pSAC09912 761 -121.3887115 38.40906334
pSAC09913 784 -121.395201 38.42305755 pSAC09914 869 -121.4018733 38.43789039
pSAC09917 656 -121.4229765 38.4742803 pSAC09919 747 -121.4477018 38.49760985
pSAC09921 944 -121.467753 38.52492028 pSAC09923 128 -121.4739148 38.54118259
pSAC09924 328 -121.4735044 38.55887761 pSAC0993 525 -121.3123931 38.29106925
pSAC09932 124 -121.5401494 38.66723129 pSAC09932 27 -121.536942 38.66241199
pSAC09933 324 -121.5402528 38.68475699 pSAC1041 61 -121.2827094 38.29128754
pSAC10412 183 -121.1143996 38.35012093 pSAC1600 -121.751548 38.0266894
pSAC1601 39 -121.7511298 38.04642408 pSAC16010 68 -121.6700725 38.16728477
pSAC16014 79 -121.5948121 38.17244286 pSAC16022 08 -121.5249046 38.26243533
pSAC16026 96 -121.5763917 38.32033194 pSAC16031 54 -121.5198846 38.36953068
pSAC16037 77 -121.5009876 38.45835343 pSAC16047 47 -121.4754026 38.59719125
pSAC16047 6 -121.4772091 38.59603848 pSAC16048 17 -121.4681596 38.60033431
pSAC1609 78 -121.676438 38.15519003 pSJ0040 -121.569888 37.89081017
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Table A.2: node location.csv data continued (headers provided for context)
Node Longitude Latitude Node Longitude Latitude
pSJ00412 61 -121.3584042 37.92692267 pSJ00412 64 -121.3578583 37.92692354
pSJ00413 427 -121.3435697 37.92694904 pSJ00414 6 -121.3204578 37.93067881
pSJ00415 318 -121.3122409 37.94359705 pSJ00416 059 -121.3008174 37.94845454
pSJ00417 684 -121.2713712 37.95343409 pSJ00420 69 -121.2176725 37.94493564
pSJ00425 -121.1456364 37.94213306 pSJ00433 1 -120.9997922 37.93003021
pSJ0048 7 -121.4283248 37.92669205 pSJ0050 -121.3336178 37.59075311
pSJ00511 801 -121.3421386 37.75953493 pSJ00512 623 -121.3318647 37.76731116
pSJ00514 84 -121.30186 37.78882 pSJ00519 808 -121.2813714 37.85880391
pSJ00528 533 -121.3355009 37.96424758 pSJ00529 99 -121.343723 37.98488937
pSJ0053 56 -121.343095 37.63812 pSJ00531 451 -121.3515713 38.00477112
pSJ00532 66 -121.3589856 38.02130593 pSJ00535 513 -121.3737412 38.06087465
pSJ00539 574 -121.398168 38.116211 pSJ01218 871 -121.2377749 38.13772447
pSJ01223 286 -121.1626202 38.137959 pSJ0261 897 -121.2321518 37.97403159
pSJ02615 06 -121.0147902 38.04996096 pSJ0266 85 -121.149469 38.00073121
pSJ0330 -121.2855301 37.62902902 pSJ0334 985 -121.343137 37.684879
pSJ0335 2 -121.3432918 37.68168863 pSJ0880 57 -121.2420498 37.98984409
pSJ0886 518 -121.1887711 38.05837897 pSJ0990 -121.1100348 37.73028285
pSJ09912 95 -121.2202039 37.88127814 pSJ09917 12 -121.234918 37.940427
pSJ09918 3 -121.2402044 37.95699387 pSJ09918 3 -121.2384902 37.95255003
pSJ09918 62 -121.2402044 37.95699387 pSJ0992 659 -121.1469672 37.75468127
pSJ09920 93 -121.250119 37.9847 pSJ09921 97 -121.245639 37.970093
pSJ09928 31 -121.25969 38.06105181 pSJ09930 12 -121.2601123 38.08720636
pSJ09932 14 -121.257663 38.116347 pSJ09932 46 -121.261389 38.14781424
pSJ09933 74 -121.2522734 38.13762139 pSJ09939 34 -121.2881304 38.24563887
pSJ0996 39 -121.1898889 37.78475688 pSJ0999 75 -121.2177366 37.83478247
pSJ1201 625 -121.2820155 37.78813451 pSJ12015 916 -121.0138979 37.79857437
pSJ12017 946 -120.9825306 37.79426729 pSJ1202 845 -121.2606335 37.78333899
pSJ1206 155 -121.2002233 37.78353264 pSJ1321 164 -121.3808729 37.63807367
pSJ1322 684 -121.3531522 37.63792265 pSJ1325 855 -121.2953493 37.63802655
pSJ1327 108 -121.273769 37.63831221 pSJ2050 -121.5571095 37.74319176
pSJ2054 547 -121.4767158 37.74876055 pSJ2059 13 -121.3965625 37.76500077
pSJ5800 -121.3410516 37.59646839 pSJ58015 344 -121.573348 37.74203
pSJ5804 344 -121.4028813 37.63911325 pSTA0040 -120.9263094 37.94485516
54
Table A.3: node location.csv data continued (headers provided for context)
Node Longitude Latitude Node Longitude Latitude
pSTA0047 296 -120.7954952 37.9372949 pSTA0048 025 -120.7858797 37.93732536
pSTA0050 -121.0890991 37.2459914 pSTA00515 855 -121.1807512 37.46383046
pSTA0330 -121.01602 37.30350024 pSTA03312 37 -121.1212556 37.46181907
pSTA03314 35 -121.1392298 37.48668958 pSTA03319 936 -121.2007551 37.55040508
pSTA0336 73 -121.0700323 37.39124474 pSTA0990 041 -120.8230979 37.4635425
pSTA0991 558 -120.848967 37.47449663 pSTA09910 034 -120.9372922 37.5745354
pSTA09915 753 -121.002433 37.63533909 pSTA09915 79 -121.006726 37.639342
pSTA09920 222 -121.0532435 37.68344775 pSTA09922 558 -121.0812845 37.70905108
pSTA09924 491 -121.1065583 37.72781144 pSTA0996 995 -120.8952555 37.53987819
pSTA0998 16 -120.9104575 37.55093052 pSTA10830 501 -120.9687095 37.73271516
pSTA10833 38 -120.9226884 37.73710837 pSTA10836 151 -120.8815917 37.75472381
pSTA10838 251 -120.847135 37.768021 pSTA1200 -120.9233269 37.79356197
pSTA12016 907 -120.6417859 37.82241116 pSTA1203 79 -120.858557 37.7842081
pSTA1206 84 -120.8164334 37.77617883 pSTA13212 9 -121.0398357 37.63858456
pSTA13218 4 -120.9343044 37.63828463 pSTA1322 435 -121.2287412 37.64126441
pSTA13220 64 -120.893295 37.63836216 pSTA13223 144 -120.8476723 37.6387246
pSTA13228 -120.7595765 37.63831123 pSTA13235 98 -120.6200509 37.63896528
pSTA13243 719 -120.4965674 37.64603574 pSTA13243 766 -120.4959318 37.64655082
pSTA13250 966 -120.3939754 37.63766777 pSTA1650 -120.8490224 37.45217896
pSTA2195 -120.9949583 37.71516897 pYOL0050 -121.6259038 38.67322197
pYOL00517 616 -121.8795805 38.79428817 pYOL0054 493 -121.7094302 38.67359078
pYOL0059 391 -121.7830965 38.70215161 pYOL0059 411 -121.7833441 38.70238159
pYOL0160 32 -122.32689 38.92405 pYOL0160 632 -122.3228299 38.92391029
pYOL01612 27 -122.1897902 38.82580862 pYOL01619 154 -122.1445999 38.73538513
pYOL01625 336 -122.0543146 38.7083048 pYOL01628 3 -122.0164557 38.68886558
pYOL01637 94 -121.8437627 38.6778947 pYOL01640 57 -121.802541 38.67765315
pYOL01641 7 -121.8024171 38.69411043 pYOL01644 69 -121.8186813 38.73540172
pYOL0165 009 -122.266182 38.90665418 pYOL0455 8 -121.7855485 38.85598621
pYOL0800 -121.7384522 38.53782033 pYOL0802 958 -121.6910688 38.55373299
pYOL0808 917 -121.5820943 38.57361129 pYOL0809 817 -121.5664648 38.57589995
pYOL0840 -121.6306397 38.31324068 pYOL08411 77 -121.582932 38.44679529
pYOL0844 57 -121.5848569 38.34259318 pYOL1130 56 -121.76887 38.522874
pYOL1130 -121.768707 38.53092751 pYOL1131 082 -121.7681903 38.54636625
pYOL11310 717 -121.7515175 38.68437879 pYOL11311 438 -121.7651354 38.69651392
pYOL11311 606 -121.7651798 38.69881554 pYOL11318 66 -121.7743281 38.7929247
pYOL11321 16 -121.7281136 38.79241239 pYOL1133 052 -121.7677506 38.57495281
pYOL1138 818 -121.7533225 38.65684523 pYOL1280 -122.095486 38.51300963
pYOL1284 59 -122.0283167 38.49465039 pYOL1287 55 -121.9912959 38.51755193
pYOL1288 42 -121.9766324 38.52287475 pYOL505 10 62 -121.955888 38.372122
pYOL5050 -121.953072 38.52565516 pYOL5050 39 -121.9531 38.53129
pYOL50510 57 -121.9425327 38.67824699 pYOL50522 29 -121.9398646 38.84765179
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Table A.4: node location.csv data continued (headers provided for context)
Node Longitude Latitude Node Longitude Latitude
z95937 -121.94518 38.931025 z95912 -122.02725 38.97159
z95864 -121.37809 38.587805 z95843 -121.3698 38.716874
z95842 -121.349 38.687718 z95841 -121.34361 38.66152
z95838 -121.4417 38.641223 z95837 -121.60207 38.700244
z95836 -121.54983 38.707236 z95835 -121.52061 38.664824
z95834 -121.50466 38.642805 z95833 -121.49623 38.616891
z95832 -121.49643 38.464667 z95831 -121.53059 38.494971
z95830 -121.2651 38.498156 z95829 -121.34715 38.476196
z95828 -121.4024 38.484747 z95827 -121.32515 38.566506
z95826 -121.37492 38.550098 z95825 -121.40726 38.594205
z95824 -121.44378 38.518356 z95823 -121.44561 38.477508
z95822 -121.49201 38.51394 z95821 -121.38181 38.623304
z95820 -121.44663 38.535795 z95819 -121.44099 38.568855
z95818 -121.49285 38.556576 z95817 -121.45996 38.551106
z95816 -121.46827 38.571661 z95815 -121.44553 38.611854
z95814 -121.49125 38.580255 z95776 -121.74189 38.681254
z95758 -121.43673 38.406432 z95742 -121.18367 38.607756
z95695 -121.80944 38.697238 z95694 -121.97757 38.537434
z95693 -121.23708 38.382367 z95690 -121.56507 38.240477
z95686 -121.44032 38.228976 z95683 -121.10036 38.492811
z95673 -121.44874 38.688069 z95670 -121.28247 38.605355
z95662 -121.2231 38.682803 z95660 -121.37656 38.676103
z95655 -121.28737 38.558073 z95641 -121.60428 38.161756
z95639 -121.51487 38.367276 z95638 -121.16166 38.317665
z95632 -121.29723 38.267544 z95627 -121.99929 38.744062
z95630 -121.15783 38.672127 z95628 -121.26529 38.654803
z95626 -121.45433 38.727451 z95624 -121.36059 38.421068
z95621 -121.3081 38.695252 z95616 -121.73655 38.549256
z95615 -121.54853 38.333568 z95612 -121.57819 38.383366
z95610 -121.27125 38.696912 z95608 -121.32702 38.628371
z95607 -122.125 38.706727 z95606 -122.21486 38.857328
z95387 -121.24702 37.539768 z95386 -120.73812 37.645632
z95385 -121.26784 37.609781 z95382 -120.8516 37.523901
z95380 -120.85196 37.48858 z95376 -121.42399 37.728417
z95367 -120.94365 37.731272 z95366 -121.12546 37.742895
z95363 -121.14555 37.477477 z95361 -120.84756 37.776528
z95360 -121.0314 37.312014 z95358 -121.05181 37.622898
z95357 -120.9061 37.667196 z95356 -121.02187 37.704138
z95355 -120.95566 37.673513 z95337 -121.23578 37.782332
z95336 -121.21416 37.812815 z95330 -121.28541 37.816876
z95329 -120.42421 37.694235 z95326 -120.86419 37.59471
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Table A.5: node location.csv data continued (headers provided for context)
Node Longitude Latitude Node Longitude Latitude
z95323 -120.7141 37.6194 z95320 -121.00179 37.797806
z95316 -120.78463 37.552329 z95313 -121.05649 37.413659
z95307 -120.95064 37.584282 z95258 -121.306 38.154118
z95242 -121.32282 38.132618 z95240 -121.25039 38.12463
z95237 -121.14855 38.162818 z95236 -121.05675 38.018456
z95231 -121.27978 37.882742 z95230 -120.82329 37.959439
z95227 -121.05361 38.205817 z95220 -121.23505 38.200193
z95219 -121.40022 38.004922 z95215 -121.19064 37.955474
z95212 -121.24213 38.038906 z95210 -121.29722 38.025086
z95209 -121.34378 38.035499 z95207 -121.3237 38.004172
z95206 -121.3025 37.922024 z95205 -121.26401 37.962873
z95204 -121.3147 37.974273 z95203 -121.30735 37.954823
z94571 -121.72075 38.156909 z95691 -121.54496 38.569193
z95605 -121.52805 38.592155
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Table A.6: Tables of Sacramento County evacuation duration case-by-case for every scenario.
Sacramento County Evacuation (Hrs.)
CFM=0 CFM=50 CFM=100 CFM=150 CFM=200
PPV=1 39 33 30 30 30
PPV=1.5 27 24 21 21 21
PPV=2 21 18 15 15 15
PPV=2.5 15 15 12 12 12
PPV=3 15 12 12 12 12
PPV=3.5 12 9 9 9 9
PPV=4 9 9 9 9 9
Sacramento County Loss of PointsE (Hrs.)
CFM=0 CFM=50 CFM=100 CFM=150 CFM=200
PPV=1 54 60 54 48 48
PPV=1.5 36 36 33 33 33
PPV=2 27 27 24 27 27
PPV=2.5 21 24 21 21 21
PPV=3 18 21 18 18 18
PPV=3.5 15 18 15 15 15
PPV=4 15 15 12 12 12
Sacramento County Loss of BayArea (Hrs.)
CFM=0 CFM=50 CFM=100 CFM=150 CFM=200
PPV=1 39 39 39 36 36
PPV=1.5 27 24 27 24 24
PPV=2 21 18 18 18 18
PPV=2.5 18 15 15 15 15
PPV=3 15 12 12 12 12
PPV=3.5 12 12 12 12 12
PPV=4 12 9 9 9 9
Sacramento County Loss of I-5 (Hrs.)
CFM=0 CFM=50 CFM=100 CFM=150 CFM=200
PPV=1 39 36 33 30 30
PPV=1.5 27 24 21 21 21
PPV=2 21 18 18 15 15
PPV=2.5 15 15 12 12 12
PPV=3 15 12 12 12 12
PPV=3.5 12 12 9 9 9
PPV=4 9 9 9 9 9
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Table A.7: Tables of Sacramento County evacuation duration case-by-case for every scenario continued.
Sacramento County Loss of CA-99 (Hrs.)
CFM=0 CFM=50 CFM=100 CFM=150 CFM=200
PPV=1 39 33 33 30 30
PPV=1.5 27 24 21 21 21
PPV=2 21 18 18 15 15
PPV=2.5 15 15 15 12 12
PPV=3 15 12 12 12 12
PPV=3.5 12 9 9 9 9
PPV=4 9 9 9 9 9
Sacramento County Loss of I-5 & CA-99 (Hrs.)
CFM=0 CFM=50 CFM=100 CFM=150 CFM=200
PPV=1 39 39 36 36 36
PPV=1.5 27 24 24 24 24
PPV=2 21 18 18 18 18
PPV=2.5 18 15 15 15 15
PPV=3 15 12 12 12 12
PPV=3.5 12 12 9 9 9
PPV=4 9 9 9 9 9
Sacramento County Loss of PointsE & I-5 (Hrs.)
CFM=0 CFM=50 CFM=100 CFM=150 CFM=200
PPV=1 57 60 57 54 54
PPV=1.5 39 42 36 36 36
PPV=2 30 33 27 27 27
PPV=2.5 24 24 21 21 21
PPV=3 21 21 18 18 18
PPV=3.5 18 18 18 15 15
PPV=4 15 15 15 12 12
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Table A.8: Tables of River-Side ZIP code evacuation duration case-by-case for every scenario.
River-Side Evacuation (Hrs.)
CFM=0 CFM=50 CFM=100 CFM=150 CFM=200
PPV=1 27 27 27 27 27
PPV=1.5 18 18 18 18 15
PPV=2 12 15 12 12 15
PPV=2.5 12 9 9 9 9
PPV=3 9 9 9 9 9
PPV=3.5 9 9 9 9 9
PPV=4 6 6 6 6 6
River-Side Loss of PointsE (Hrs.)
CFM0 CFM 50 CFM 100 CFM 150 CFM 200
PPV=1 36 39 36 36 36
PPV=1.5 24 27 27 27 24
PPV=2 18 21 18 18 21
PPV=2.5 15 15 15 15 15
PPV=3 12 15 12 12 12
PPV=3.5 12 12 12 12 12
PPV=4 9 9 9 9 9
River-Side Loss of BayArea (Hrs.)
CFM=0 CFM=50 CFM=100 CFM=150 CFM=200
PPV=1 33 36 36 36 36
PPV=1.5 21 24 24 24 24
PPV=2 18 18 18 18 18
PPV=2.5 15 15 15 15 15
PPV=3 12 12 12 12 12
PPV=3.5 9 9 9 12 9
PPV=4 9 9 9 9 9
River-Side Loss of I-5 (Hrs.)
CFM=0 CFM=50 CFM=100 CFM=150 CFM=200
PPV=1 30 30 27 27 27
PPV=1.5 18 18 18 18 18
PPV=2 15 15 15 15 15
PPV=2.5 12 9 9 9 9
PPV=3 9 9 9 9 9
PPV=3.5 9 9 6 9 9
PPV=4 9 6 6 6 6
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Table A.9: Tables of River-Side ZIP code evacuation duration case-by-case for every scenario.
River-Side Loss of CA-99 (Hrs.)
CFM=0 CFM=50 CFM=100 CFM=150 CFM=200
PPV=1 30 27 27 27 27
PPV=1.5 21 18 18 18 18
PPV=2 15 15 12 15 15
PPV=2.5 12 9 9 9 9
PPV=3 12 9 9 9 9
PPV=3.5 9 9 6 6 9
PPV=4 9 6 6 6 6
River-Side Loss of I-5 & CA-99 (Hrs.)
CFM=0 CFM=50 CFM=100 CFM=150 CFM=200
PPV=1 30 27 27 27 27
PPV=1.5 21 18 18 18 18
PPV=2 18 15 15 15 15
PPV=2.5 12 9 9 9 9
PPV=3 12 9 9 9 9
PPV=3.5 9 9 6 6 9
PPV=4 9 6 6 6 6
River-Side Loss of PointsE & I-5 (Hrs.)
CFM=0 CFM=50 CFM=100 CFM=150 CFM=200
PPV=1 48 42 42 42 42
PPV=1.5 30 30 27 27 27
PPV=2 24 21 21 21 21
PPV=2.5 18 15 15 15 15
PPV=3 15 15 15 15 15
PPV=3.5 12 12 12 12 12
PPV=4 12 9 9 9 9















Table A.12: evaclist.csv data (headers provided for context)
ZIP code Epoch ZIP code Epoch
z95864 t1 z95843 t1
z95842 t1 z95841 t1
z95838 t1 z95837 t1
z95836 t1 z95835 t1
z95834 t1 z95833 t1
z95832 t1 z95830 t1
z95829 t1 z95828 t1
z95827 t1 z95826 t1
z95825 t1 z95824 t1
z95823 t1 z95822 t1
z95821 t1 z95820 t1
z95819 t1 z95818 t1
z95817 t1 z95816 t1
z95815 t1 z95814 t1
z95758 t1 z95742 t1
z95693 t1 z95690 t1
z95683 t1 z95673 t1
z95670 t1 z95662 t1
z95660 t1 z95655 t1
z95641 t1 z95639 t1
z95638 t1 z95632 t1
z95630 t1 z95628 t1
z95626 t1 z95624 t1
z95621 t1 z95615 t1
z95610 t1 z95608 t1
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